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VERTICAL RESTRIANTS 
AND PRODUCERS' COMPETITION 
Abstract 
This  paper  examines the  rationale for  vertical restraints. 
It  shows  that  there  are  important circumstances uner which  these 
restrictions  have significant anti-competitive  effects.  The paper 
focuses on the consequences of exclusive territorial arrangements 
among  the  retailers  of  two  products  which  are  imperfect 
substitutes.  Such  arrangements are  shown  to  increase consumer 
prices;  under  plausible  conditions  the  increase  in  consumer 
prices is  sufficiently large  to more  than  offset the deleterious 
effects  from  "double  marginalization" resulting  from  reduced 
competition  among  retailers,  The  imposition  of  exclusivity 
provisions is  may  be  part  of a Nash equilibrium among producers. 
These results hold whether there  are  or are  not  franchise fees. 
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France I.  INTRODUCTION 
Vertical  relationships between  producers and  retailers or 
wholesalers  often  involve  more  or  less  complex  contracting 
arrangements,  broadly  named  vertical  restraints.  These 
arrangements can  simply  consist  in  non-linear tariffs,  such as 
franchise fees,  quantity forcing or pricing requirements  (quotas, 
Resale  Price  Maintenance),  but  they  may  also  include  the 
assignment  of  exclusive territories  or  exclusive dealing,  tie- 
ins,  etc  This  paper  is  concerned  with  investigating  the 
rationale  for  these  restrictions  and  showing  that  there  are 
important  circumstances  under  which  these  restrictions  and 
showing  that  there  are  important  circumstances under  which  these 
restrictions  have significant anti-competitive  effects. 
The  legal  status  of these  restraints differs  among  countries 
and  has  changed over  times.2  From  the  economic point of  view, 
two  main  streams  of  ideas  have  emerged:  on  one  side  is  the 
argument  that  since  markets'  are  competitive  and  since 
arrangements  would  be  adopted  only  if  they  increase  joint 
profits,  they  must  necessarily be  efficiency enhancing; on  the 
See  Slair-Kaserman l983J  and  Caves  [l984J  for  a general 
presentation of  vertical restraints,  s  well  as  a  comprehensive 
discussion of their  economic incidence. 
2  For  instance,  RMP is generally  considered to be  illegal; 
however,  some  States  in  the  US. had for  a while adopted "fair 
trade"  laws,  which partially authorized  RMP.  Thus,  even  looking 
only  at the  case  of the U.S.,  RPM,  which  was originally viewed as 
a per se violation of  the Sherman act,  had been accepted in  some 
States,  till  1975;  it  is  now again illegal  in all  States.  In the 
same  way,  assigning  exclusive  territories,  after  having  been 
considered as per  se illegal,  is now subject  to a rule  of reason 
standard. 
1 other  side  is  the  contention thet  these  restraints have  anti- 
competitive effects  at  the  lower  (retailers'  or  wholesalers') 
level 
There have  been  several  recent  attempts  to  formalize  the 
efficiency argument  (see  for  example  Mathewson-Winter  [1983], 
[1984])  viewing  the  vertical  relationship  as  a  principal- 
agent(s)  relationship;  the  emphasis  is  placed  on  control 
a  deals  with a  set  of  more or 
less  comoetirive  retailers,  whose actions  (retail prices,  selling 
efforts,  err.)  affect  the  total  profits;  the  problem  for  the 
producer is  thus  to  design a  contract in  order  to  achieve  the 
integrated solution,  i.e.  to make the retailers choose  the  right 
actions  and  to  recover  back  the  generated profits.  The  main 
conclusion n this  framework  is  that  vertical  restraints  are 
always  privately desirable,  as they allow a better control of the 
retailers.3  Moreover,  as  they  help  in  correcting  certain 
problems associated  with linear  pricing rules,  such  as the double 
msrginalization problem  (Spengler,  [1950])  or  the  free-rider 
problem  (Telser,  [1960]),  these  vertical restraints are  usually 
thought of as increasing  social  welfare. 
This  apologetical view  has  already been  shaded by  recent 
For  an  introduction  to  this  literature  on  vertical 
control,  see  Rey-Tirole  ]l986s].  Indeed,  one  of  the objectives 
of  this  literature is  to  define the  "minimal  set  of  sufficient 
tools",  which  lead  to  a  perfect control of  the distributors by 
the  producer.  (Exclusive  territories  plus  franchise  fees) 
generally  constitutes  an  example  of  such  a  minimal  set:  it 
amounts in  effect to  "selling  the  firm"  (or,  more exactly, the 
production technology). 
2 work,  which has  emphasized,  for  instance,  the divergence  between 
the monopolist's and  the consumers' valuations for distributors' 
services  (see  Scherer  [1983),  Comanor  [1985]  and  Caillaud-Rey 
[19871)  or  the  role  of  distributors'  private  information  in 
uncertain  markets  (see  Rey-Tirole  [198Gb)).  The  general 
framework is,  however,  the  same,  and  in  particular inter-brand 
competition (i.e.,  competition  among producers) is neglected. 
We will argue  here that producers' competition is in fact  a 
crucial  element for  the analysis of vertical arrangements.  As we 
will  show,  when there  is  imperfect competition among producers, 
then  vertical restraints  may serve  to facilitate collusion.  The 
contractual arrangement  may indeed increase  joint profits but  the 
gains  to  the  producers and distributors are  at  the  expense  of 
consumers.  Vertical  restraints  may  thus  not  be  socially 
desirable. 
We  emphasize here  the interaction  between the  design of  the 
internal  (producer/retailer)  contract  and  the  external 
competitive situation at  the upper  (producer)  level.  A natural 
framework  within which to examine  these  issues  is provided by the 
multi-principal-multi-agents  approach (Fershtman  and Judd [19841, 
[1986)),  which has  recently been used  by  Bernheixs and Whinston 
[1986],  for  the  case  of  common agency,  and by  Katz  [19871,  for 
the  case  of rivalrous  agencies.  This approach,  following earlier 
work  (Stiglitz (1986))  noting the  role  of  such  relationships as 
entry  deterrents,  stresses in  particular  the  role  of  internal 
principal/agents  contracts  as  a  commitment  for  sustaining 
3 collusion among principals;  it also  emphasizes the importance of 
the  definition  of  admissible contracts  and  the  role  of  each 
agent's  information.  This  approach  has  already  yielded  new 
insights  in  the  snslysis  of  imperfect  competition  (see 
respectively  gernheimWhinston  [1985]  and  Bonanno-Vickets 
[1987]).  As we will see!  it  also  constitutes a useful tool  for 
the  analysis  of  the  rationale  and  the  incidence  of  vertical 
restraints. 
II  -  EXCLUSIVE  TERRITORIES  AS A DEVICE  TD REDUCE COMPETITIQII 
We  consider  here  a  simple  model,  borrowed from Rey-Stiglitz 
[1985],  which  shows  how  exclusive territories,  which obviously 
reduce  competition at  the  lower  level,  may actually be  a  way  of 
reducing competition  at  the uppet level  as well.  The basic ides 
is  that  when  retailers enjoy  some  kind of  monopolistic power, 
they  may  put  higher mark-ups in  the  retail  price:  this  price 
distortion,  in turn,  induces  some change on the cross sensitivity 
of  this  demand  towards  the  prices  of  the  manufacturer's 
competitors.  The  manufacturers may  therefore perceive a  less 
elastic demand than when they  directly compete  against each other 
or when they  use competitive retailers.  This  effect in  turn  may 
induce  both  producers to  assign exclusive territories to  their 
retailers. 
-  - 
4 Let  us  describe this  model.  There  are  two  manufacturers. 
each  producing a  simple  good with a  constant marginal cost  c1 
and  distributing it via retailers  who have  no retail costs.  The 
two  products are  imperfect substitutes.  The  final  demand for 
good  i  ,  associated  with  retail  prices  qi  and  q 
,  is  given 
by  D1(q1,q)  For  simplicity,  we  assume  Symmetry,  Cl — C2 
— 
c,  and  V  x  ,  y  e  R+  ,  D1(x,y)  —  D2(y,x)  Consumers have  no 
search  cost and  thus  buy  from  the  lowest  possible price for  each 
product.  Lastly,  we  will  suppose  in  the  following  that  all 
profit  functions  are  concave,  admit  a  unique--and  interior-- 
maximum,  and we will  thus  focus  on first-order  conditions. 
We  can  define  two  useful  benchmarks,  corresponding 
respectively to perfect collusion and  direct  competition between 
producers: 
-  the  collusive outcome  is  defined by  the  maximization of 
the  aggregate profits:  (q1-c)D1(q,q) +  (q2-c)D2(q,q)  ,  and 
leads  to the monopolistic  price  q*: 
where  l  and  respectively denote  the  direct and  cross 
price  elasticities  of  the  final  demands  (E1—3logD1/3logq) 
The  monopolistic mark-up  is  thus  the  higher,  the  lower  is  the 
sensitivity of  the  demand for  a product with respect  to  its  own 
price  and  the  higher is  the  sensitivity of  this  demand to  the 
price  of the other product4 
-  the  outcome associated  with direct competition corresponds 
As the  two goods  are subatitutes  one  has:  2  0 
5 to the  (Nash)  equilibrium  of a game  where  each  producer contrcls 
rhe consumer price, q and  where  his payoff is (q-c)D(q1,q2) 
The  "competitive"  price  qc  is characterized  by  (under  standard 
assumptions  on payoff functions): 
(2)  (qcc)/qc  l/c1(qt,qt) 
Of  course  the  "competitive"  profits  are  lower  than  those 
with perfect collusion.  When the  two products are  substitutes, 
retail  prices  also  are  lower;  each  producer, when he  chooses  his 
own  price,  does  not  take  into  account the  fact  that  his  rival's 
gain  from  an  increase in  his  own  price.  Note  that  indeed,  it 
would be in the  interest of  the  producers to convince each  other 
that  they would follow  up any price increase  with a further price 
increase 
Let  us  now  make  precise  the  imperfectly  competitive 
framework on which we will  focus.  It is  supposed that  producers 
observe the quantity bought  by the retailers  and possibly whether 
or  not  the  retailers  distribute  their  products;  they  do  not 
observe  either  the  quantities sold  by  the  retailers nor  their 
profits or the prices they  charge.  On  the other hand,  retailers 
have  perfect information  and observe  the contracts signed by each 
producer;  in  particular,  they  can  engage  in  arbitrage  if  a 
producer tries  to discriminate  between them.  Finally,  producers 
may  assign exclusive  territories  to  their  retailers  (in  which 
case  these  territories are  supposed to  be  symmetric and  thus 
6 representative  of  the  total  market.5  Given  these  informational 
assumptions,  the admissible contracts between a producer and his 
retailers can  only  include,  besides the  assignment of  exclusive 
territories,  wholesale  tariffs  based  on  the  quantity bought by 
the  retailers  Tha  possibility of  arbitrage from the  retailers 
rules  out  non-constant marginal prices;  producers  may however 
impose  franchise  fees  on  the  retailers  if  they  effectively 
observe  who  sell,  their  products.  W€  have  imposed  a  set  of 
informational assumptions intended  to  rationalize a  particular 
simple  form  of  contractual  relationship.  Readers  may 
alternatively  take  these  contractual  ralationships  as  given, 
treating our analysis as simply  investigating  their  consequences. 
We  assume  that,  in  those  cases  where  the  producer imposes 
franchise  fees,  ft  can  preclude  those  who  do  not  pay  the 
franchise fee from,  for  instance,  buying the good from  some  other 
retailer and  selling it.  We will  consider both situations wh€.re 
there  are,  and are  not  franchise  fees. 
We  formalize the  competitive  framework  as  a  two-stage game: 
in the  first  stage,  given  some  vertical contracting arrangement, 
producers simultaneously choose  their  wholesale prices,  i  and 
The  following assumptions  are  more  precisely presented 
and  discussed in Rey-Stiglitz [19851.  The  two  main  assumptions 
are  the  asymmetry in information  between retailers and producers 
about retail prices  and sales,  and  the  fact  that  all  contracts 
are  common knowledge.  The  first  assumption may be  justified in 
several  ways,  including moral  hazard aspects on  the retail side 
(see  Rey-Tirole  [l986b]).  The  assumption  that  the  retailers 
observe  all  producers' contracts allows  producers,  as  we  will 
see,  to  use  these  contracts in order to achieve higher profits: 
they  are  therefore  strongly interested  in  making  them  common 
knowledge. 
7 P2 (and eventually the  franchise  fees);  then  in the second stage, 
retailers  observe all wholesale  tariffs and aiaultaneousiy  choose 
their  retail  prices.  We  will  consider in  the  following the 
(subgame)  perfect  equilibria  of  this  two-stage  game, 
corresponding to  two  initial  situations:  in  the  first  one, 
retailers are  pure  price  competitors  wheteas in  the aecond one, 
exclusive  territories  have  been  assigned to the  retailers. 
i)  In  absence of  vertical arrangement,  pure  (intra-breod) 
price  competition leeds  the  retailers  to charge zero  mark-upa in 
the second stage,  and thus equilibrium  retail  prices are  equal  to 
the wholesale prices chosen in the first age:  qi  P1  (this  in 
turn  implies  that  franchise  fees,  even  if  they are  available, 
must  be  equal  to  zero)  .  The  situation  is  therefore  formally 
identical  to  the  situation  of  "direct"  competition  berween 
producers that  we  already  characterized.  Ac  the  end  of  this 
subgame,  the  wholesale  and  rerail  prices  are  equal  to  the 
"competirive"  price  qc  ,  retail profits are  zero  and producers 
get  the  "competitive"  profits. 
ii)  Let  us  now  suppose  that  producers  have  assigned 
exclusive territories to  their  retailers.  These  arrangements 
eliminate intra-brand competition and  thus  each  retailer enjoys 
monopolistic power  over  some  fixed  fraction of  the  final  demand 
for  his  product.  Given the  producers'  prices  i  and  P2  at 
the second stage some  retail  price  equilibrium  will emerge, 
(4(p1,p2)  q(p1,p2)):  each  retail  price is  a function of the 
two producers'  prices;  note that franchise fees,  which should  be 
S viewed as fixed  costs,  can  alter  the retailers'  decisions about 
distributing  or not  a product, but  do not change the price 
response function.  For  simplicity,  we will again assume 
symmetry: 
Vx,yeR÷ 
,  q(x,y) 
— 4(y,x) 
a) Suppose  first  that  franchise  fees  are not available. 
At  the  first  stage  producer  i  chooses  a price  i  to maximize: 
(3)  l  (p1-c)D1(q(p,p),q (pl.p2)) 
which  leads  to wholesale and  retail  prices  which satisfy: 
P1  P2  P  qI — q  qe q  (pepe)  ,  and: 
(4)  p(ec)/pel/[fl(qe,qe)pl(pe,pe)+  2(q5,q5)P2(P5,P5fl 
where  P1  and  P2  respectively denote  the  elasticities of  a 
given  retailer's  price with respect to his producer's (for  pi) 
and  the rival's (for  p2)  wholesale  prices  (P1 — alogq/alogp) 
b)  Suppose  now that  producers  can  require  franchise fees. 
Anticipating  the  retail  price  equilibrium  (which,  as  already 
noticed, is not  modified by  the  introduction  of  franchise fees), 
the  producer can recover via  the  franchise fees  the  associated 
retail  profits.  Thus producer  i's  profits are given by: 
r  r  r 
(5)  * q1(pl,p2) 
-  c)D1(q1(p1,p),q2(p,p)) 
- 
The  equilibrium  condition  becomes: 
(6)  (q-c)/q — l/(E1(q,q) + 
Let  us  briefly comment on this  analysis.  If,  as  one might 
normally  ex.pect,  competitive  pressures result  in  P1  being 
positive but less  than  one,  and  P2 being positive but  less  than then one  obtains: 
(7)  qe  me ￿  PC  qC  and  qm  qf  qC 
Thus,  wben exclusive territories ate  assigned,  equilibriua 
retail  pricea  are  increased  whether  or  not  franchise fees  are 
required 
In the  caae  where  franchise faes  are not allowed,  wholesala 
prices ate  also  higher when exclusive territoriea  ace  assigned. 
This  comes  fcoa  a  change  in  the  elasticity  of  the  perceived 
demand;  we  can  decompose this  change into  two  effects:  first, 
the  reduction of  demsnd from  a  price  increase is altered by  the 
fact  that  the  retail  price of  a product only partially responds 
to the corceaponding  wholesale  price;  secondly,  the  loss  of sales 
is  alao  decreased because the  rival's retailers,  who  then  face 
higher competing retail  prices,  find  it optimal to increase their 
own  prices.  This  decrease in the sensitivity  of  demand to price 
increases leads  to higher wholesale  price response functions and, 
thus  to  higher wholesale prices  in  the  equilibrium.  If  double 
marginalization problems are  not  too  important,  (that  is  if  the 
mark-up of retail price  over  wholesale  price is  not  too  large) 
6  Retailers  that  find  that  their  wholesale  prices  have 
increased  while their  competitors  have not,  do not simply pass  on 
the  increase with  the  usual  mark-up,  but  rather absorb  some  of 
the  cost  increase themselves  (i.e.  0 ￿ P1  I)  .  This  in turn 
induces  the competitors  to increase  their  own retail prices 
P2 ￿  0);  it seems,  however,  reasonable to suppose that  the  direct 
effect,  measured by  P1 
,  is  higher than  the  indirect  one: 
P2  P1 
10 then  producers  profits  also  are  higher  when  exclusive 
territories  are assigned to retailers. 
In the  case where franchise fees are  allowed,  then  the  above 
analysis  shows  that  under  reasonable  assumptions,  producers' 
profits  are higher when  exclusive territories  are  assigned.  Tins 
comes  not  only  from  a decrease of the elasticity of the perceived 
demand,  but  also  from  the  fact  that,  b assigning exclusive 
territories  to their  retailers,  producers generate higher retail 
7  prtces 
Diarammat  i. Analys  is 
Our  two  stage  analysis ran  be  represented  diagrammatically 
as in Figures  1  and  2.  Given wholesale  prices (pl,p2},  Figure  1. 
depicts  the retailer reaction functions,  given  q  as a function 
for  q  and  conversely.  The  intersection of  the  two  is  the 
retailer equilibrium,  which we have  denoted by  qjt(p1,p2 
can  easily  trace  out  how  the  retail  price  changes  as  the 
wholesale  price  changes,  simply  by  seeing  how  the  reaction 
functions  shift, 
Producers take  these  reactions into  account in  calculating 
their  optimal price,  for  a given wholesale price of  their  rival. 
Similar effects are  present  in  the  context analyzed by 
Bonannon-Vickers l987].  Two situations  are  there  compared:  the 
first  one  corresponds  to  what  we  called  "direct  competition" 
between producers;  in the second one,  each producer delegates to 
a single  agent the distribution  of his  good.  Formally,  the  first 
situation  is  similar  to  the  situation where  each  product  is 
distributed  via perfectly  competitive  retailers,  while the  second 
situation  (delegation)  corresponds  to  exclusive  territories  in 
our  framework. 
11. Thus,  in  figure  2  we  have  plotted the  wholesale price  reaction 
function.  The  market  equilibrium is  the  intersection of  the 
reaction function.  The market equilibrium  is the intersection  of 
the reaction functions. 
We  can  see  the  effects  of  the  alternative  contractual 
arrangements  in Figure  2.  The  solid  line  represents the reaction 
function  without  exclusive  territories,  the  dotted  line 
represents the reaction function  with exclusive territories,  but 
without franchise fees,  and  the dashed line  the reaction function 
with  exclusive  territories  and  franchise fees.  Our  previous 
calculations  verify that  exclusive  territories  increase wholesale 
prices,  by shifting the response functions  upwards.8 
IV.  COMMENTS 
In  the  model  just  analyzed,  the  producers  are  presumably 
better  off  when  exclusive  territories  are  assigned  to  the 
distributors.  Tt  does  not  a  priori  imply  that  producers will 
indeed assign exclusive territories  to  their  retailers (unless 
they  can  cooperatively agree  to  do  so) .  A  possible way  for 
analyzing  the  producers'  choices  of  vertical  arrangements 
consists  in introducing  a new  stage  at the beginning of the  game, 
where  each  producer chooses  between  competition and  exclusive 
territories  for his retailers.  Rey-Stiglitz [1985]  provides an 
example  where  aaaigning  exclusive  territories  and  requiring 
Other  comparisons  (of  profits,  retail prices,  atc)  are 
dependent upon particular parameter  values. 
12 franchise fees  l.a  actually a dominant strategy for  each  producer, 
although  the  corresponding outcome  is  Pareto  dominated by  the 
outcome associated to  the  situation where  both producers commit 
themselves  to  assign  exclusive  territories  and  to  require  no 
franchise fees  (there  is  thus  a  standard "prisoners'  dilemma') 
This  example  highlights the potential role  of vertical restraints 
for  decreasing  competition  between  the  producers  and  also 
emphasizes  the  divergence  between  collective  and  individual 
rationality:  two  phenomena which  were  ignored  in  most of  the 
previous analyses  of vertical restraints.9 
Indeed  in  this  analysis,  retailers  can  be  considered  as 
black boxes"  or  "response  machines:  by modifying the vertical 
arrangements  proposed  to  this  retailers,  a  producer  simply 
commits himself to  respond in  a  given  way  to  any  change of  his 
rivals'  attitudes.  Of course  if all possible  response machines' 
were available,  complete collusion would then  be  achievable (see 
Katz  [l9B7J);  the  question therefore is to define  the admissible 
"black  boxes".  In  this  respect,  vertical  restraints  can  be 
viewed as  a natural tool  for constructing  more efficient  response 
machines,  i.e.  response machines which enable the  producers to 
decrease competition amongst themselves.  (In addition, vertical 
restraints  such  as  exclusive  territories  may  be  more  easily 
Telser [l960J  and Posner  [l977}  suggested that  RPM could 
help producers in sustaining  collusion  by reducing their  interest 
in  wholesale  price  cuts.  It  has  also  been  suggested  that 
exclusivity  requirements  (such as exclusive  dealing)  can  serve  to 
deter  entry,  as  they  compel  the  potential entrants to  set  up 
their  own distribution  networks. 
13 enforced then  price agreements,  and  have ths further  advantage of 
nors easily slipping under  the  net of anti-trust laws.)  Other 
ways prolucers may uóe vertical restraints to reduce competition 
include;  for  instince,  in  the  previous, model,  producers' 
modifying  the design of territories  in order to decrease as much 
as  possible  the  elasticity  of  the  perceived  demand. 
£ltsrnativsly, proucers  could  give  the  right  to  sell  their 
produèts to: the  sme retaileO (common agency),  or  distribute 
their product  via  wholesalers,  who in turn could assign exclusive 
territories to  r.éailers, etc.  In othsrcoitexts,  depending on 
observability and enforceability conditions,  different vertical 
r.stratuts  might  also  be  introduced  litind  the  set  of 
available 'response  machines'. 
.  . 
This  analysis sheds new tights on  the economic effect of the 
use  of  vertical  restraints on  markets  performance and  social 
welfare.  Till  now,  two  extreme  situations  were  mainly 
considered:  the  first  one  refers  to  perfectly  competitive 
markets, where only efficiency arguments can explain the use of 
these restraints; the second situation  corresponds  to the case of 
a  monopolistic  producer  and,  although  private  and  social 
interests may conflict,  at  least from the  .private point of view 
efficiency  arguments may  still, to some extent,  be relevant.  But 
if one considers a situation  where there is isperfect  competition 
among producers (which is generally true  in the widely discussed 
cases  involving  the  use  of  vertical  restraints),  then  a  new 
motivation Ippears:  vertical restraints may be used to decrease 
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on  social  welfare,  the  gain  in  additional  profits  beLng 
overwhelmed by  the  loss  of consumers' surplua.  While  the  above 
snalysia  ia  very  partial,  it  auggests  a  new  approach  for  the 
economic  theory  of  vertical  restraints,  an  approach  with 
important  policy implications. 
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